June 25-36, 2026, Doubt Workshop, Human Abilities Center in Berlin.
Doubt, uncertainty and ambivalence
June 10-11, 2026, PUCRS Epistemology Conference, Porto Alegre (Brazil).
Defeat by inclusion of new possibilities
November 21, 2025, Deference and Technology Workshop, Washington University in St. Louis.
Can computers know?
November 5, 2025, Brown Bag Seminar at CONCEPT, University of Cologne.
Uncertainty as an interrogative attitude (co-authored by Matthew McGrath).
October 17, 2025, Inquiry Network (online)
Uncertainty as an interrogative attitude (co-authored by Matthew McGrath).
June 18–21, 2025, Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Cornell University.
Deflating representations of modality.
May 18–20, 2025, St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR).
Instrumentalism for the unmotivated.
May 1–3, 2025, Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Neuroscience (SPAN), Washington University in St. Louis.
Deflating representations of modality.
April 16, 2025, Pacific APA, San Francisco.
Comments on Ralph Wedgwood's Rationality and Belief (Oxford University Press).
July 04, 2024, Rhein-Ruhr Epistemology Meeting, University of Duisburg-Essen.
The Four Categorical Attitudes.
June 13–14, 2024, Inquiry and its Norms III, UNED Madrid.
On questions and pseudo-questions.
May 02–03. 2024, Rationality and Cognition, Ruhr University Bochum.
Inquiry forbidden.
February 08, 2024, Philosophy Visiting Speaker Seminar, University of Stirling.
Fixing an attitude in the face of indeterminacy.
January 19, 2024, Cologne-Frankfurt Epistemology Meeting, University of Cologne.
Gappy Evidence Vs. Evidence of Gaps.
November 28–29, 2023, Goethe Epistemology Meeting, University of Frankfurt.
Inquiry Forbidden.
November 02–03, 2023, Veritas Philosophy Workshop, Yonsei University.
Three Types of Indeterminacy and their Epistemology.
October 13, 2023, Lisbon Wittgenstein Group Seminar, NOVA University of Lisboa.
Pseudo-questions and the norms of inquiry.
July 31-August 4, 2023, Summer School in Philosophy with Ram Neta, University of Cologne.
On the import of epistemic akrasia to the distinction between structural and substantial rationality.
April 12, 2023, X Social Epistemology Conference, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina.
The effects of natural language communication on our epistemic states.
February 03–04, 2023, Meeting of the Florida Philosophical Association, New College of Florida.
A puzzle about the rationality of higher-order beliefs.
October 19–22, 2022, Doxastic Attitudes and their Reasons, University of Cologne.
A puzzle about presupposition.
July 8–9, 2022, First Workshop on Suspension, University of Konstanz.
The third stance and the proper means to express it.
June 24, 2022, CLIP Seminar, University of Cologne.
Questions, pseudo-questions and the semantics of interrogatives.
June 7–8, 2022, Hinge Epistemology Conference, NOVA University of Lisbon.
Evidential support under hinges.
May 22–24, 2022, St. Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality, St. Louis.
Good reasons to be coherent.
April 29–30, 2022, Central States Philosophical Association, University of Nebraska.
Rules for the direction of the inquiring mind.
February 21, 2022, The Inquiry Network Group
A rule for the direction of the inquiring mind.
October 25 (seminar of DFG group on suspension) and December 10 (Leuven CLPS seminar), 2021
Reasoning under suspense.
August 2–5, 2021, 12 Principia International Symposium.
Coherence and knowability.
July 22–23, 2021, First Rhine-Ruhr Epistemology Meeting, University of Cologne.
Akrasia and the contents of higher-order beliefs.
April 10, 2021 APA Pacific Division, Portland.
Suspending is not believing (Colloquium: Epistemology).
April 6, 2021 APA Pacific Division, Portland.
Paradoxes of Knowability (Group session of the Southern California Epistemology Network).
March 4, 2021, Epistemology Seminar at the University of Florida (organized by Rodrigo Borges).
Suspending is not believing.
22.08.2019, Knowledge of Knowledge, University of Regensburg.
As I think about knowledge, it starts to disappear (handout available here).
17.07.2019, I Symposium on Logic and Analytic Philosophy & VIII Social Epistemology Conference, Federal University of Maranhão.
Models in formal epistemology.
24.06.2019, Logic Rulez!?, University of Vienna.
How does logic constrain rational suspended judgment? (handout available here).
19.06.2019, Formal Epistemology Workshop 2019, University of Turin.
Rational requirements of agnosticism (poster presentation).
29.11.2018, III International Colloquium on Analytic Epistemology, UFSM Santa Maria.
Reasoning with suspended judgment (handout available here).
19.11.2018, Workshop with Johan van Benthem, RWTH Aachen University.
Knowability through deductive reasoning and Dynamic Epistemic Logic (handout available here).
27.08.2018, Philosophy Colloquium, University of Miami.
When reasoners suspend judgment.
11.06.2018, Workshop with Paul Boghossian on conscious and unconscious inferences, University of Antwerp.
From the taking condition to the psychology of reasoning.
15.05.2018, Perception, Mental Imagery and Inference, Ruhr-University Bochum.
Mental models, imagery and symbolic processing.
04.05.2018, Understanding Understanding, University of Tübingen.
Understanding the logical constants.
21.11.2017, I International Workshop GP-CRI—Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Santa Maria, Brazil).
Evidence and a priori knowability.
23-24.10.2017, I Workshop on Philosophy and Probability, PUCRS (Porto Alegre, Brazil).
Suspended judgment, credence and bridge-principles.
21-26.08.2017, ECAP 9 – European Society for Analytic Philosophy, LMU Munich.
Analyticity, suppositional reasoning and the a priori.
31.07.2017, Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students, MCMP.
Knowledge of validity.
14-16.06.2017, The Normativity of Logic, University of Bergen.
Ways in which logic was supposed to be special, but ain't.
18-19.05.2017, Reasoning Club 2017, Center for Logic, Language and Cognition, Torino.
Knowledge grounded on pure reasoning.
04-06.04.2017, UConn Logic Group/MCMP Workshop in Storrs, University of Connecticut.
The Epistemology of Logic and Logical Pluralism.
15.12.2016, The Third Lisbon Conference on Philosophy of Science, Universidade de Lisboa.
The epistemology of logic and logical pluralism.
19.11.2016, Workshop: The Relevance of Logic to Human Reasoning, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy.
When reasoners go offline. This workshop was organized by me and my colleague Andreas Kapsner.
10.09.2016, Colloquium Logicum 2016, Universität Hamburg.
A framework for testing the relevance of logic to reasoning.
29.08.2016, Logic, Meaning and Language, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Reliable reasoning in natural language.
08.04.2016, Roots of Deduction Workshop, University of Groningen.
Warranted Logical Beliefs.
24.07.2015, Buenos Aires Logic Group WIP Seminar, University of Buenos Aires.
A logic of offline rationality.